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This paper provides a rationale for group support for political violence in situations 
where violence does not provide a material benefit. Rabin’s (1993) theory of fairness 
is adopted to demonstrate that although group violence may not be the equilibrium of 
a material game it may be a fairness equilibrium in a game containing psychological 
payoffs.  For this to happen the material stakes must be perceived as low and 
psychological payoffs are expressive. Although the material stakes are actually high, 
members of each group may choose expressively to support the use of violence 
because the probability of being decisive is low. The paper also considers the 
possibility of peace emerging as a fairness equilibrium. This can only happen if each 
group perceives the other as making some sacrifice in choosing peace. 
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1. Introduction 
Fearon (2006) provides a survey of work on ethnic mobilisation and ethnic violence. 
Within that survey he discusses explanations for ethnic violence. Violent conflict 
(whether ethnic or not) is a puzzle from a rationalist perspective as conflict is 
inefficient. In reviewing possible explanations he draws attention to the idea that 
interethnic violence is strongly related to intraethnic politics and that ‘violence is a 
tool by which political elites maintain or increase their political support’, but that the 
‘central theoretical puzzle for such ‘diversionary’ arguments is why publics would 
increase their support for a leader who takes actions, such as provoking ethnic 
violence, that by hypothesis makes them worse off’. (p. 863). This paper will attempt 
to address this theoretical puzzle. 
Rationalist explanations for conflict in models that treat groups as unitary actors 
can be divided into the three main explanations reviewed by Fearon (1995); 
bargaining failures due to private information (for example in Cetinyan (2002)); 
commitment problems (for example in Fearon (2004)) and issue indivisibilities (as, 
for example, implied by Bernholz (2004)) on terrorism and supreme values). Models 
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that allow for intra-group heterogeneity and thus intra-group competition provide a 
richer environment for exploring group conflict and in particular the competition 
between doves that are essentially unwilling to use violence to pursue their goals and 
hawks who are willing to use violence to pursue their goals. In the next section we 
will review the rationalist literature on support for violence which may make sense 
from a material perspective (in the absence of commitment to an efficient outcome), 
but the crux of Fearon’s puzzle is the support for violence where it does not provide 
an obvious material benefit, in fact, the violence leads to a predictable material loss. 
Problems of commitment and indivisibilities still play a background role in this 
paper.1 The key difference in the setting depicted here (which is one of complete 
information), is that they are not sufficient to explain the existence of group conflict 
which is not depicted as the equilibrium of a material game. Rather group conflict 
emerges when emotions are added to the analysis. 
Rationalist explanations arguably suffer from downplaying the role of emotions 
when emotions clearly seem to play a central role in group conflict.2 Fearon and 
Laitin (2000) observe that anger seems to play a clear role in group conflict, and such 
that it often seems to be the case that launching an attack against a strong opponent 
provokes a predictably harsh response which in turn generates in-group anger and 
support for violence. We might extend this observation and argue that the same sort of 
mechanism is in play within the strong group, namely that if launching a harsh 
response is likely to prolong the terrorism and violence emanating from the weak 
group surely then emotions must be playing a part in the support for the harsh 
response. Sambanis (2004) provides a critique of empirical tests of economic models 
of civil war such as Fearon and Laitin (2003) and Collier and Hoeffler (2004). As part 
of his call for greater use of case studies is the idea that case studies do better at 
identifying micro-level details such as emotional response. Sambanis argues that 
emotional and economic theories can be combined with ‘emotion-based explanations 
as focusing on the demand side of the equation and economic models as focusing on 
the supply side. As we develop more of the demand side, it becomes obvious that 
ideology and psychology cannot be ignored as explanations of civil war.’ (p. 268). 
This paper is an effort in that direction; an attempt to set-up an emotionally based 
                                                 
1 Powell (2006) argues that indivisibilities can be subsumed under commitment problems. 




model of the demand for violence but one that can be incorporated within a rational 
choice model. 
This paper explores the idea that one group is weak relative to a strong group. This 
can be viewed as a relatively strong incumbent being opposed by a relatively weak 
group where both groups contain peace-seeking doves and hawks willing to use 
violence. In a choice between passivity and aggression the strong group has a 
dominant strategy to be aggressive in response to whatever action the weak group 
takes. If the weak group is aggressive, at a relatively small cost the strong group is 
better off fighting than conceding and also for a small cost of aggression they are 
better off claiming all of the issue under dispute than striking a bargain with the weak 
group. In response to aggression by the strong group the weak group should in its 
material interest concede since fighting will only bring costly defeat for no gain over 
the issue.  
We incorporate emotions by turning to behavioural economics and Rabin’s (1993) 
theory of fairness and explore why the weak group might actually choose aggression 
in response to aggression. Rabin’s theory tells us that so long as the stakes are not so 
high, we can expect to see reciprocal behaviour such that harmful actions are met with 
harmful actions and helpful actions are met with helpful actions. A key challenge, 
however, for the application studied here is to explain why we should ever expect the 
stakes to be low when group conflict is clearly a high stakes game? We point to the 
crucial role of mass collective action. As groups become larger, individual 
decisiveness falls such that the instrumental stakes fall (Brennan and Lomasky 
(1993)). This means that the indirect material costs of engaging in conflict may be 
discounted, but the direct expressive benefits of reciprocation may be exaggerated 
compared to their actual importance for ex post welfare. As a result, weak group 
members may choose aggression as an angry expressive response to aggression by the 
strong group, even though if they were decisive they would not have made such a 
choice. We incorporate a key role for intra-group competition by focussing on the 
rhetoric that is used in political competition. Politicians seeking violence may not 
need to make the claim that violence brings material rewards, rather they simply need 
to ensure that group members view interaction with the other group through an 
emotional lens. To that end we depict political competition between doves and hawks 
as one that might focus more on a battle between cognitive and emotional appeals 
rather than a focus on issues (such as territorial claims) for which there may be little 
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disagreement within the group. In addition, it will be argued that there may be 
heterogeneity within the group with regard to the ability of individual group members 
to detach themselves from an emotional perspective. 
Fearon’s central puzzle focuses on members of a weak group supporting violence 
that makes them worse-off. This paper pays close attention to that idea, but extends 
the question to ask why the strong group may not be inclined to reward seemingly 
helpful behaviour by the weak group and thus provide for the Pareto superior outcome 
of mutual peace compared to mutual aggression. We argue that it is important to 
members of the strong group to actually believe that if the weak group chooses 
passivity that this choice is not simply in their material interests in any case. If they 
believe that the weak group is making sacrifices in the pursuit of peace then peace 
may be possible. 
 
2. Related Literature 
The key feature of this paper is that members of the competing groups may support 
violent attacks on the other group, even though the violent attack provokes a harsh 
response that makes group members materially worse-off. The group approval 
provides an incentive for hawks to commit violence even when there is no great 
likelihood that the violence will succeed. The paradox, as stated, is why the in-group 
public  incentivise hawks to use violence in situations where it makes them worse-off. 
The phenomenon of insurgent violence, met by incumbent crackdowns, followed by 
support from members of both groups for the use of violence would seem fairly self-
evident. Fearon and Laitin (2000) in their unconventional review of a number of 
books exploring ethnic conflict find considerable evidence of the use of violence to 
construct antagonistic ethnic identities which generates more violence and material 
loss. Tessler and Robbins (2007) stress the importance of public support for terrorists 
and explore Arab support for attacks against the United States. Jaegar et al (2010) 
study the phenomenon of support for violence in Palestine. 
 For the paradox to make sense there must be some alternative potential set of dove 
leaders who would not use violence as a strategy. This points us towards models of 
intra-group competition between doves and hawks. Examples are Kydd and Walter 
(2002) who argue that the reason we see the use of violence by extremists is to 
undermine trust between moderate negotiators and the government. The government 
may be forced to conclude that the moderates do not control their group and thus need 
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to use violent crackdowns to protect themselves. Hamlin and Jennings (2007) and 
Jennings (forthcoming) argue that the selection of hawks and the use of violence 
makes sense when the anticipated cost of conflict is relatively low. In this case it is 
worth incurring conflict costs because the hawks will produce a better bargain than a 
dovish and peaceful approach. Whilst recognising intra-group competition between 
doves and hawks the problem with approaches such as these is that they do not tackle 
why publics increase their support for hawks in response to crackdowns where it 
makes the publics materially worse-off. Either the issue of public support is not 
addressed, or where it is addressed support is offered because the public calculate they 
are materially better-off supporting hawks. 
 There have been a number of papers where the use of violence to mobilise support 
plays a central role. In de Figueiredo and Weingast (2001), suppression by an in-
group moves the preferences of moderates within an out-group closer to radicals 
within the out-group. This provides a motive for terrorism; the ultimate bargain may 
be closer to radical preferences. In Rosendorff and Sandler (2004) the mobilisation of 
support is linked to heavy-handed approaches by government. While both these 
papers recognise the phenomenon they both assume that violence met with violence 
generates support for the perpetrators of violence and they do not analyse why this 
would be the case. Other papers have attempted to endogenise the decision. In Ginkel 
and Smith (1999), dissident violence signals to the public that they represent that the 
incumbent is fragile and as a result the public may offer their support. This may 
succeed such as in the Velvet Revolution in Czechoslovakia in 1989, or it may fail as 
in Tiananmen Square in the same year. In the case of failure this looks like a potential 
answer to the paradox, the motivation for support for violence or rebellion is that 
supporters wrongly calculated that the rebellion would succeed. Siqueira and Sandler 
(2006) model competition between government and terrorists for supporters. The 
dilemma facing the government is that while a harsh crackdown reduces the 
probability of success for terrorists and thus its attractiveness to potential supporters, 
shifting resources out of public spending reduces the opportunity cost of supporting 
terror. Significantly, Siqueira and Sandler also include an exogenous parameter for 
underlying support for terrorism. Bueno de Mesquita (2005) models terrorist 
recruitment and Bueno de Mesquita and Dickson (2007) model the competition 
between doves and hawks within a group rebelling against the government. Similarly 
to Siqueira and Sandler they argue that a crackdown in response to violence can 
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increase or reduce mobilisation, based on the balance of increased security which 
reduces support against ideological fomentation and reduced economic opportunity 
which increases support. 
 These papers provide an answer as to why public support might follow 
crackdowns; economic opportunity and ideology may outweigh the effect of a 
reduced probability of winning. However, this is an instrumental explanation for 
political support and thus does not address the paradox of support for violence which 
by hypothesis makes the supporters worse-off. It appears that there are a significant 
number of cases where the material calculation should really point towards the 
support for peaceful negotiation but yet the support is for those that perpetrate 
violence. In the last three papers discussed, ideology is an argument in the utility 
function and in the Bueno de Mesquita (2005) case, it is assumed to be increasing 
with the severity of the crackdown. This is a non-economic, emotional dimension and 
the endogenisation of emotional payoffs and their trade-off with material payoffs are 
the focus of this paper.  
That emotions such as anger exist in conflict is well-documented. Gordon and 
Arian (2001) find that the stronger the threat, the more belligerent the policy choice. 
They argue that when one feels threatened the decision-making process with regard to 
policy is dominated by emotions rather than logic. Halperin (2008) finds that group-
based hatred helps to interpret events and direct behaviour (emotional goals and 
action tendencies) in a way that contributes to the continuation of the conflict. Maoz 
and McAuley (2008) look at the demand for aggressive policies by a strong group in 
response to a weak group. They find support for both perception of threat and 
dehumanisation as determinants of demand. The latter factor is clearly very worrying 
as it implies hatred as a determinant of policy. 
A key aspect of this paper is that political competition between doves will be 
fought through the use of rhetoric; whereby the former within the weak group may 
have to depend on cognitive arguments regarding the costs of conflict, whereas hawks 
can make emotional appeals based on reciprocal aggression. That emotional appeals 
may be more effective than cognitive appeals is supported by Gadarian (2010) who 
finds, in the context of foreign policy attitudes in response to terrorism, that emotional 
cues rather than threatening information alone influence attitudes. Sheafer and Dvir-
Gvirsman (2010) find, in the context of attitudes towards the Oslo peace process, that 
the public response to negative framing is much stronger than to positive framing. In 
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this paper hawks by recommending aggression frame the interaction with the other 
group negatively. 
A crucial component of the analysis presented here is that emotional decision-
making in circumstances of conflict may be expressive. This refers to the idea that 
since individual decisions are unlikely to be decisive in determining outcomes. 
Instrumental decision-making which focuses on the indirect benefit of choosing X in 
order to achieve Y may give way to expressive benefits which focuses on the utility 
directly gained from making the decision to choose X and this is disconnected from 
eventual outcomes. For an overview of work on expressive choice see Hamlin and 
Jennings (forthcoming), Hillman (2010) and to a large extent the analysis of 
expressive choice in a conflict setting expands upon the depiction of expressive 
choice presented in Hamlin and Jennings (2007) and Jennings (forthcoming). Finally, 
we also allow for the possibility that individuals can control their emotions, although 
such control may be costly. This picks up on the literature in behavioural economics 
that recognises emotions as an example of a visceral determinant of behaviour, but 
also that there may be mechanisms available for individuals to self-control. See 
Lowenstein (2003) for a review. 
 
3. The Model 
We will depict a three-stage game, with each stage being played simultaneously in a 
strong group and a weak group. In stage 1, hawks and doves in each group make 
rhetorical appeals for support which appeal to material and/or emotional concerns. In 
stage 2, members of both groups can consciously decide to control their emotions if 
the expected gain from doing so outweighs the cost of such control. The cost of 
controlling emotions may be influenced by the rhetoric used in stage 1. Then in stage 
3, group members will choose whether to support aggression or passivity in response 
to aggression or passivity by the other group. Group members will be aware that it is 
only with a small probability that their individual choice actually determines the 
action that their group will select. We will study each stage in turn working 
backwards from stage 3. 
3.1.1 Stage 3   
We begin by depicting the general form of the normal-form game played between a 
weak and a strong group. Players can choose to be aggressive or passive and the 
payoffs are as follows where we start by considering a two-player setting 
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   Strong Group  
  agg pass 
Weak Group agg ( ),aw asc R c− − ( ) ,0dwR c−  
 pass ( )0, dsR c−  ( ), 1R Rα α−
Figure 1 
We assume there is an issue or space that can be divided between the two groups such 
that the allocation to each group sums to R. When one group is passive and the other 
aggressive, the passive group receives 0 and the aggressive group receives R. When 
there is mutual aggression the stronger group wins and receives R while the weak 
group receives 0. dwc  and dsc  are aggression costs for the weak and strong groups 
when confronted by passive opponents. These costs reflect the idea that in order to 
dictate to the other group some threshold level of military and other resources 
required for governance needs to be invested in. The opportunity cost of this 
investment is higher for the weak group than the strong group so that ds dwc c< . awc  is 
the cost of aggression to a weak group when there is mutual aggression and likewise 
asc  is the cost of aggression for the strong group when there is mutual aggression. We 
assume that dw awc c<  and ds asc c< . This reflects the idea that costs of aggression are 
higher when met by aggression from the other side compared to passivity. If both 
groups are passive, aggression costs are removed and there will be a distribution of 
the issue or territory such that 0 1α≤ ≤ , α is assumed indivisible so that if there is to 
be a peace deal regarding the distribution of R, then this is the only one available. The 
focus of the paper is not on bargaining and how commitment can be made to any 
bargain that is struck. The paper assumes indivisibilities and commitment problems 
and depicts a game where the existence of these problems is not sufficient to explain 
mutual aggression. Rather they need to be combined with emotionality. 
We assume that the ranking of the material payoffs for each player (where the best 
payoff equals 1 and the lowest payoff equals 4) is as follows 
  Strong Group  
  agg pass 
Weak Group agg 4, 3 1 or 2, 4




The payoffs for the strong group are assumed to be unambiguous. The best outcome 
for the strong group would be (pass, agg). This means that they concede nothing and 
since the weak group does not resist the costs of aggression are low. The next best is 
(pass, pass). We wish only to study games where aggression is a dominant material 
strategy for the strong group. Therefore, dscα >  is an assumption, but one that is 
justifiable where bargaining outcomes cannot be smoothed so it is not possible for the 
value of α  to be continuous from 0 to 1. Finally, we assume that mutual conflict with 
victory (agg, agg) is preferred to the avoidance of conflict but making full concessions 
to the weak group.  
For the weak group the worst outcome is (agg, agg). They will lose the conflict 
because they are weak and thus gain no concessions despite incurring aggression 
costs. The second worst outcome is assumed to be (pass, agg) because they receive no 
concessions although they don’t incur aggression costs. We will analyse two different 
permutations of payoffs based on the following possibilities. If the weak group is very 
weak (pass, pass) may be preferable (agg, pass) as the costs of aggression (even 
though the aggression is not reciprocated) may be too high to make it worth pursuing 
full concessions. We will analyse two types of game. The first will consider the case 
where passivity is a dominant material strategy for the weak group and the second 
where it is not. Note though that purely in terms of material payoffs, regardless of the 
ranking of  ( )dwR c−  compared Rα  to there is only one pure strategy Nash 
equilibrium (pass, agg).  
We will now incorporate the idea of Rabin’s fairness equilibria and discover that 
depending on the material stakes and whether ( )dwR c−  is greater or less than Rα , 
the Nash equilibrium may be overturned and replaced with fairness equilibria which 
imply either mutual aggression or mutual passivity. Material stakes will become 
smaller as the membership of the two groups increase because the probability of being 
decisive becomes smaller. This requires expressive benefits which are unrelated to 








3.1.2 Fairness Equilibria 
With the game set up, we need to recap on the key ingredients of Rabin’s theory of 
fairness in games before applying it to the subject of this paper - group conflict.3  
From the material game, a psychological game is derived which will determine each 
player’s psychological utility. This will depend on three factors. The weak group’s 
strategy wa  depends on their belief about the strategy of the strong group sb  and their 
belief about the strong group’s belief regarding their strategy wc . A similar description 
applies to the strong player. We focus only on pure strategies, so all strategies and 
beliefs about strategies are included in the set }{ ,agg pass .   
We derive a kindness function for the weak player, ( ),w w sf a b  and the weak 
player’s perception of the strong player’s kindness ( )~ ,s wsf b c . These are expressed as 
follows 




s w s s s
w w s






−= −  (1) 
and 






w w s w w
s ws






−= −  (2) 
( )fairs sbπ  is defined as ( ) ( ) 2h ls s s sb bπ π⎡ ⎤+⎣ ⎦  where ( )hs sbπ  and ( )ls sbπ  are Pareto 
efficient and likewise for  ( )fairw wcπ . 
The following utility function for the weak group is assumed which incorporates 
material and psychological payoffs 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )~, , , , . 1 ,w w s w w w s s s w w w sU a b c a b f b c f a bπ ⎡ ⎤= + +⎣ ⎦  (3) 
and similarly for  ( ), ,s s w sU a b c .  
Finally, the pair of strategies ( ) }{, ,w sa a agg pass∈ is a fairness equilibrium if for 
,i w s=  
 (1) }{ ( ),arg max , ,ww w s wa agg passa U a b c∈∈  
 (2) w w wc b a= =  
 
                                                 
3 In addition to the Rabin article itself, see the textbook discussion in Wilkinson (2008).  
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3.1.3 Analysis of the Game 
A key point to note is that in an environment where only material payoffs count for 
utility, regardless of whether ( )dwR c−  is greater or less than αR there is a unique pure 
strategy Nash equilibrium (pass, agg). Aggression is a dominant strategy for the 
strong group and the best response for the weak group is to choose passivity. We will 
consider the possibility that some group members view the game as a purely material 
one, but others will view it as containing psychological payoffs. Incorporating 
psychological payoffs may change equilibria. We will demonstrate for small enough 
probability of being decisive, in the case where ( )dwR R cα > − , (agg, agg) is a unique 
fairness equilibrium. In the case where ( )dwR R cα < −  for small enough probability 
of being decisive  there are two fairness equilibria, (agg, agg) and (pass, pass).  
 
4. Case 1: ( )dwR R cα > −  
We demonstrate the condition under which (agg, agg) would be the unique fairness 
equilibrium. We first consider a two player game which provides a useful benchmark 
as each player is clearly decisive with regard to which action is selected. We will then 
extend the analysis to ns players in the strong group and nw players in the weak group 
simultaneously choosing their preferred action under the assumption that they 
determine the outcome with probability 1/ns and 1/nwrespectively. This means that 
even if only one member chooses aggression it happens as a group action with 
positive probability albeit very small if n is large.  
4.1.1 Stage 3 in the Two Player Case 
We begin by deriving
~
sf . If the weak group member believes that the strong group 
believes they are choosing aggression and that the strong group chooses aggression in 









c R c c
f
R c c
− − − −= = −− +  (4) 
If the weak group chooses aggression when they believe that the strong group chooses 
aggression then 




R c R c
f
R c R c
− − −= = −− − −  (5) 
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Note that there is only one Pareto efficient choice in response to the choice of 
aggression by the strong group – namely to choose passivity. 
The weak group will choose aggression rather than passivity in response to aggression 
by the strong group if 
 [ ] [ ]1 11 1 0 1 02 2awc− − − > − −  (6) 
which reduces to  
 1 1
2 awc
>  (7) 
It is straightforward to check that the strong group would choose aggression in 
response to weak group aggression. As part of their utility function,
~
1wf = − . So the 
strong group will choose aggression because ( ) 1 11 1 0 1 12 2asR c ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤− − − > − +⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ . It is 
both materially and psychologically preferable for the strong group to choose 
aggression. It is also straightforward to see that (pass, pass) cannot be a fairness 
equilibrium. The crucial point is that in this case
~
0wf = . If the strong group chooses 
passivity, it is in the material interest of the weak group to also choose passively so 
there is no act of kindness associated with the choice. Since there is no kindness 
displayed there is no incentive for reciprocity and only material payoffs count for the 
strong group and as a result they will choose aggression in response to passivity 
chosen by the weak group. 
 In this setting, the addition of psychological payoffs would not alter the 
equilibrium of the game. Given that caw is to be viewed as a very large number (7) 
will not hold. Psychological payoffs are swamped by material payoffs and the 
equilibrium will be (pass, agg). 
4.1.2 Stage 3 in the n-Player Case 
The analysis is now extended to allow for large groups. For ease of exposition we will 
assume that each group is of size n. It is assumed that when each individual makes a 
decision their choice of action makes that group action more likely with a probability 
of 1/n. In the following analysis na is the number of group members that support 
aggression and np is the number that support passivity. To capture the role of 
expressive payoffs a weight j is introduced where 0 1j≤ ≤ . The weak group member 
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will choose aggression rather than passivity in response to aggression by the strong 
group if 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )
1 10 0 0 1 0
2
1 1 1 1 10 0 0 1
2 2 2
p p pa aw aw a
p pa aw a a
n n nn c c n j j
n n n n n n n
n nn c n nj j
n n n n n n n
⎛ ⎞− + − + + − − + >⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞− + + + − − − −⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
 (8) 
Which reduces to 
 1 1
2 1awc nj j
> + −  (9)  
If j =0 an individual fully absorbs the psychological payoff that comes from the group 
decision. So, for example, if the weak group chooses passivity in response to 
aggression by the strong group, even though the individual chooses aggression he will 
experience a psychological payoff of -1/2. If j = 1 regardless of the group choice, the 
individual will receive a psychological payoff related to his own choice. So if the 
group choose passivity in response to strong group aggression, but the individual 
chooses aggression his psychological payoff will equal zero. This is an expressive 
payoff. The choice of an action brings a direct expressive payoff and if j =1 the 
choice is fully expressive. The action brings a direct psychological payoff which is 
unrelated to the actual outcome of the game. Essentially, in the example discussed 
above the individual when choosing aggression but not causing aggression still 
receives a higher psychological payoff for his reciprocal choice.  
For any j > 0 there is an expressive component to the individual’s choice, and from 
(9) we see that in the limit where j =1 aggression will be selected by an individual if  
1 1
2 awc n
>  . Earlier we stated that in a 2-player game (n = 1) we would not expect 
this condition to hold because caw is assumed large. If n is also large the analysis 
changes because the instrumental stakes have been lowered by the lower probability 
of being decisive and for j > 0 the individual receives an expressive payoff even 
though they are not decisive in determining whether the group behaviour is reciprocal 
or not. 
As for the 2-player game it is straightforward to show that strong group members 




( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1 1 1 1 3 10 1
2 2 2 2
1 1 3 1 3 30 0 1
2 2 2 2
p p pa as as a
p pa as a a
n n nn R c R c n j j
n n n n n n n
n nn R c n nj j
n n n n n n n
− − ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞+ + − − − − − >⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
− ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞+ + − − − − −⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
 (10) 
which must hold because both the material and psychological payoffs are higher by 
choosing aggression than passivity. 
 Also it is straightforward, as before, to show that (pass, pass) cannot be a fairness 
equilibrium in the n-player game. The weak group shows no kindness towards the 
strong group in choosing passivity in response to passivity so psychological payoffs 
drop out. As a result, aggression is the best response for all members of the strong 
group. 
  Note also that we allow, and will analyse in stage 2 of the game, the possibility that 
members of the both groups can choose to control their emotions and view the game 
as purely material. This will make no difference to the decision for members of the 
strong group. They will choose aggression whether they are emotional or not. For 
weak group members, if they are emotional and (9) holds they will choose aggression 
in response to aggression, but if they are not emotional they will choose passivity in 
response to aggression. 
 In the Rabin analysis games played between two players are analysed. In these 
cases for psychological payoffs to dominate and fairness equilibria to emerge the 
stakes need to be relatively small. So for example, if we consider emotional rejection 
of offers in the ultimatum game, they are rejected because the psychological gain 
from rejecting the offer outweighs the low material gain. Rabin provides several 
convincing arguments to defend the theory against the charge that it is only relevant 
when it is relatively trivial and this paper attempts to extend this defence to 
incorporate the nature of group choice in a political setting. We argue that the act of 
choosing to meet aggression with aggression satisfies a sense of emotional 
indignation even if actual aggression does not take place. The material payoff, on the 
other hand, is subject to standard instrumental reasoning. Although the stakes may be 
exceptionally large if decisive, in mass political action individual decision-makers 
determine the outcome only with a small probability.  
4.2 Stage 2 
In stage 3 members of both groups can decide whether to choose aggression or 
passivity as their choice of group action and they will be decisive with probability 1/n. 
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If (9) holds, those that are emotional within the weak group will select aggression and 
those that are unemotional will choose passivity. In the strong group, the presence or 
absence of emotions does not affect the decision which is to choose aggression. Why 
might a member choose to be emotional and another member not. We focus first on 
members of the weak group. 




pa aw aw a awn jn c c n c v
n n n n





paw n jc v
n n
−+ >  (12) 
This tells us that if the cost of incurring aggression costs weighted by the probability 
of bringing it about and the extent to which an individual absorbs the psychological 
cost of a group decision to choose passivity despite choosing aggression himself 
outweighs the cost of controlling emotions, then the weak group member will control 
his emotions. 
 If all awcv n<  then all will self-control and aggression will not be selected by any 
members of the weak group. If all ( )1 2aw jcv n −> +  all group members will choose 
not to self-control and choose aggression in stage 3. We allow for the intermediate 
possibility to be possible. This requires that if we order group members in terms of 
their cost of v, v must increase faster than ( )1 2j−  which is the rate at which the cost 
of emotional decision-making increases as more members choose passivity. 
 In the strong group we can see that some members may also choose to control their 
emotions although this would not alter their decision to choose aggression in stage 3. 
This follows from (10) and will happen if 12v <  given that all members choose 
aggression in stage 3. 
4.3 Stage 1 
We have depicted one source of heterogeneity within a group; the ability to control 
emotions. A second is that some individuals will wish to become leaders of the group 
and of these types some will have a preference for the pursuit of aggression (hawks) 
and some for the pursuit of passivity (doves). We do not endogenise for these 
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potential leaders and they are not treated as strategic. We simply present hawks as 
arguing for aggression and doves as arguing for peace, but the strength of their 
argument is determined by the future play of the game. 
 Note that in the strong group the dove has no chance of success against the hawk. 
Materially and psychologically members of the strong group are better choosing 
aggression against any action the weak group might take. The interesting battle is in 
the weak group. It is clear that weak group members will be better off materially if 
they choose passivity, but they will be better off psychologically if they reciprocate 
strong group aggression with aggression of their own. This means that weak group 
doves must make a cognitive argument for passivity, while the weak group hawks can 
make an emotional argument for aggression. As discussed in the literature review it is 
argued that emotional appeals are considered to be more effective than cognitive 
appeals. Here the argument would be one of standing up against injustice rather than 
meekly conceding for the sake of self-preservation. This could be formalised by 
making v a function of stage 1 of political rhetoric, such that v is increased for all 
group members after stage 1 because the hawk possesses a rhetorical advantage in 
being able to make emotional appeals to group members to stand up against injustice. 
This would reduce the number of weak group members that would choose to self-
control in stage 2 and thus choose passivity in stage 3. 
4.4.  Summary 
To summarise for ( )dwR R cα > − , the key result is that the Nash equilibrium (pass, 
agg) can be overturned for a unique fairness equilibrium (agg, agg). This is made 
more likely because politicians in the weak group seeking aggression can increase the 
initial values of v in stage 1 because the language of justice is on their side. The 
behaviour of the strong group is uncomplicated. Although some members of that 
group (with low values of vwill control their negative emotions, strong group doves 
have no basis upon which they can make a case for group members to prefer passivity 
to aggression. The reason is that aggression in response to aggression is both 
materially in group members’ interests and accords with their sense of justice by 
hurting the weak group which is hurting them. In addition, they can make no case for 
pursuing passivity which will be met by passivity by the weak group because passive 
behaviour by the weak group is not considered an act of kindness by strong group 
members and thus there is no case for making material sacrifices to help a group 
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which is helping them.  Note though that if some weak group members do choose to 
self-control, passivity will be chosen with positive probability by the weak group. 
This means that (pass, agg) would still exist as a possible equilibrium of the game 
although this would be a Nash equilibrium and not a fairness equilibrium. 
 
5. Case 2: ( )dwR R cα < −  
We now turn to the case where ( )dwR R cα < − . Inspection of the payoffs in the game 
inform us that the weak group would be displaying kindness towards the strong group 
if they choose passivity in response to passivity by the strong group and it is this that 
allows for the possibility of a (pass, pass) equilibrium and the maximisation of social 
surplus. The condition for (agg, agg) to be a fairness equilibrium (9) are the same as 
before. We now demonstrate the conditions for (pass, pass) to be an equilibrium. The 
value of 
~









−= =−  (13) 
 
If the weak group chooses aggression, 1 2wf = −  and if they choose 
passivity, 1 2wf = . Therefore, passivity will be chosen if 
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which reduces to  
 ( )( )
1 1
12 1 dw nj jR cα > + −− −  (15) 
For the strong group, 
~
1
2wf =  so members will choose passivity over aggression if 
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There are now two pure strategy fairness equilibria, so we have a familiar 
coordination problem but one where (pass, pass) Pareto dominates (agg, agg). Both of 
these potential fairness equilibria will be considered in turn starting with (pass, pass). 
 Since the utility from reciprocating passivity is big enough in both groups to 
outweigh the material loss that passivity entails as shown in (15) and (17), no member 
in stage 2 would choose to control their emotions as they would be incurring a cost v 
to obtain a 1/n gain in material payoff and lose the positive psychological payoffs that 
made choosing passivity preferable. In stage 1, the doves in both groups can make 
emotional arguments for peace because it reciprocates an act of sacrifice by the other 
group. In case 1, passivity by the weak group was not viewed as an act worthy of 
reciprocation by the strong group as it involved no sacrifice by the weak group. In 
fact, in case 1 it was in the material interest of the weak group to choose passivity 
over aggression. In this fairness equilibrium, v plays no functional role as no 
individual will choose to control emotions in stage 2 as they would be incurring a cost 
to rid themselves of a positive benefit. 
 We now turn to the (agg, agg) fairness equilibrium. Earlier in case 1 we argued that 
that this equilibrium will emerge with a probability less than 1 if some members of 
the weak group choose to control their emotions. With a positive probability (pass, 
agg) will emerge as the equilibrium which, of course, is the equilibrium of the game 
when it only involves material payoffs. If the group decision is made by emotional 
members of the group then (agg, agg) is a stable equilibrium because as in case 1 
emotional and non-emotional members of the strong group would not revise their 
aggressive best response.  
However, if the group decision is made by the non-emotional members of the weak 
group to be passive, then the composition of strong group types (determined in stage 
2) now matters. Emotional members of the strong group would wish to revise their 
choice and choose passivity in response to passivity, but the best response to strong 
group passivity is aggression for non-emotional weak group members which would 
undermine (pass, agg) as an equilibrium of the game. If, however, the strong group 
decision were made by non-emotional materially motivated members (pass, agg) 
would be a stable equilibrium. Interestingly this implies that if the members of the 
weak group that controlled their emotions in stage 2 and proved to determine the 
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weak group choice to be passive, could then switch their emotions back on again in 
stage 3 then (pass,pass) would emerge as an equilibrium.Given that (pass, pass) 
Pareto dominates (agg, agg) is it realistic to suppose that the latter outcome would 
ever emerge? One reason (although delving beyond the confines of the current model) 
would be that if there is no history of trust between the groups, that group members 
are emotional and that they perceive each other as inherently aggressive then (agg, 
agg) seems a quite plausible candidate as the equilibrium. It is clear that these features 
would appear to be common characteristics of many conflicts. 
 
6. Discussion 
Section 3 finished in a rather optimistic fashion. When it is the case that the weak 
group is actually making material sacrifices to choose passivity in response to 
passivity by the strong group then mutual peace may emerge as a fairness equilibrium. 
But the main inspiration for this paper was to rationalise ‘irrational’ conflict, not to 
rationalise ‘irrational’ peace. So where we observe mutual conflict of the sort 
exhibited in this paper, what has been the cause? If we turn to case 1, the cause is 
straightforward. Members of the strong group do not see any sacrifice on the part of 
the weak group members if they were to choose passivity. For that reason, they will 
choose aggression in response to passivity as it maximises their material payoff. If the 
weak group were purely materially motivated (pass, agg) would be the Nash 
equilibrium of the game. However, because weak group members (having discounted 
their likelihood of being decisive) may be angered by the aggression shown by the 
strong group they may emotionally choose aggression in response. Clearly, aggression 
would then be the materially and emotionally best response by the strong group and 
thus ‘irrational’ conflict can emerge. The ‘irrationality’ can be viewed from the 
perspective that there are two outcomes that are Pareto superior to (agg, agg), namely 
(pass, agg) and (pass, pass). The latter suffers from the familiar public good type 
problem that it is a dominated strategy for the strong group and thus it is individually 
rational for strong group members to choose aggression. Although the reason for 
(pass, pass) not being an equilibrium in case 1 is clear enough it does beg the question 
explored by Fearon (1995) as to why an outcome which would maximise social 
surplus cannot be reached. He provides three main reasons; 1) asymmetric 
information; 2) commitment problems and 3) issue indivisibilities. This paper does 
not dig deeply into why an inefficient outcome is allowed to persist, but in the context 
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of this paper both commitment problems and issue indivisibilities would be relevant. 
The innovation in this paper is to argue that emotions are required in addition to these 
problems to generate mutual aggression, otherwise the outcome would be the peaceful 
(though inefficient) dictatorship by the strong group. The (agg, agg) outcome is driven 
by emotions of the kind explored by Rabin, but the explanation for why they feature 
heavily in this paper is not that the stakes are small, but rather that the stakes are made 
to seem small due to mass collective action rendering individuals largely non-decisive 
in determining political outcomes.  
Case 2 is clearly more hopeful, but an (agg, agg) outcome is still a fairness 
equilibrium. This case opens issues in the study of conflict for which this paper might 
provide some initial insights. In case 1, ultimately the reason there is conflict is that 
from the perspective of the strong group passivity displayed by the weak group 
provides them with no positive utility through reciprocation. If the weak group could 
be viewed as making a sacrifice then those that seek peace within the strong group 
would have something to work with when fighting for support. 
So in a richer model with incomplete information, it would be interesting to 
explore the idea that the true state of payoffs for the weak group is unknown to the 
strong group. If the strong group holds that on observing passivity by the weak group 
that the weak group is playing its dominant strategy, an emotionally charged weak 
group may ensure that these beliefs are held out-of-equilibrium as they would only 
choose aggression anticipating aggression by the strong group.4 To that extent, it 
shifts the attention from focussing on why the weak group takes actions that clearly 
seems against their material interest to the way in which group interaction is 
perceived within the strong group. If it is the case that the weak group really can make 
sacrifices it is important for the prospects for peace that members of the strong group 
can come to believe this. If they do, mutual peace becomes a possibility if political 
interaction is treated as emotional as well as material in nature.  
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